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Abstract—Over the last two decades, software development has
moved away from centralized, plan-based management toward
agile methodologies such as Scrum. Agile methodologies are
founded on a shared set of core principles, including selforganizing software development teams. Such teams are promoted as a way to increase both developer productivity and
team morale, which is echoed by academic research. However,
recent works on agile neglect to consider strategic behavior
among developers, particularly during task assignment–one of
the primary functions of a self-organizing team. This paper
argues that self-organizing software teams could be readily
modeled using game theory, providing insight into how agile
developers may act when behaving strategically. We support
our argument by presenting a general model for self-assignment
of development tasks based on and extending concepts drawn
from established game theory research. We further introduce
the software engineering community to two metrics drawn from
game theory—the price-of-stability and price-of-anarchy—which
can be used to gauge the efficiencies of self-organizing teams
compared to centralized management. We demonstrate how these
metrics can be used in a case study evaluating the hypothesis that
smaller teams self-organize more efficiently than larger teams,
with conditional support for that hypothesis. Our game-theoretic
framework provides new perspective for the software engineering
community, opening many avenues for future research.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The publication of the Agile Manifesto [1] in 2001 instigated
a long-lived change in the way software development teams
are managed, pushing the industry toward agile methodologies
such as Scrum or lean [2]. A reported 95% of respondents
in the 2020 State of Agile report—software professionals
from across the world in industries ranging from technology
to retail—reported that agile development methodologies are
used in their workplace. Most (75%) use them for sprint
planning and agile project management, primarily Scrum [3].
One key principle of the Agile Manifesto is “[t]he
best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from
self-organizing teams” [1]. As organizations embrace agile
software development, they eschew centralized, plan-driven
project management in favor of multi-functional, autonomous
teams that can quickly adapt to changing requirements without
top-down planning [4]. Self-organization is a topic of much
research, with a variety of studies seeking to understand roles
in self-organizing teams (SOTs) (e.g., see [5]–[9]) and task
assignment in agile project management (e.g., see [10]–[12]).
These studies provide insight into the practices and benefits of
SOTs, but do little to explore strategic self-organization, where
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developers consider the choices of all other developers while
seeking their best personal outcome. If team members are left
to choose their own tasks strategically, they may sacrifice some
social good for their own utility, decreasing the efficiency of
the team compared to a team with an ideal centralized plan. We
believe there is a need for further study of strategic behavior to
answer the following research questions within the software
engineering domain: (A) How can we (theoretically) model
and understand strategic behavior in SOTs? (B) How can we
evaluate and measure the efficiency of developers’ strategic
behavior? (C) How do developers self-organize in real-world
settings, and is it consistent with the model’s predictions?
This paper advocates for the use of non-cooperative gametheoretic models and concepts to address the above questions.
We argue that aspects of developer behavior in SOTs can
be modeled using game theory. Game-theoretic models are
used in software engineering research (see, e.g., [13], [14])
but currently only apply to other aspects of the software
development lifecycle (e.g., bug fixes, testing).
To address our research questions, we outline a preliminary
game-theoretic model of self-assignment of development tasks
in a SOT, and provide a detailed example of how our model
can be used to evaluate the efficiency of self-organization
compared to ideal plan-based project management (A). We
introduce the software engineering community to two measures of efficiency used in game theory research but not yet
applied in the software engineering domain—the price-ofstability (PoS) and the price-of-anarchy (PoA) [15], [16]—and
describe their use with a concrete realization of our model (B).
We leave our third question for future human subject studies
to determine specific parameters for the model (C).
We use PoS/PoA to evaluate the efficiency of a simulated
SOT in a concrete realization of our model, based on Tullock
contests [17]–[20]. Our simulation provides evidence that
smaller teams may self-organize more efficiently than larger
teams when considering team morale, but may be less efficient
when considering team productivity. We describe our findings
and provide examples of future research that could grow from
our model and conclude by summarizing related work.
II. S ELF -O RGANIZATION AS A G AME
Agile teams are expected to self-organize; the members
divide roles and tasks rather than having them assigned [4]. On
a typical Scrum team, self assignment is performed every one

or two weeks (i.e., a sprint). For each sprint, the team picks a
set of development tasks to perform (the sprint backlog). The
developers then independently select tasks they will work on
during the sprint from the sprint backlog. As the developers are
selecting tasks for themselves, this affords an opportunity for
strategic behavior, where each selects tasks to advance their
own best interest.
A. How can we model strategic behavior in SOTs?
Strategic self-assignment of tasks among developers on a
SOT can be modeled and understood by representing it as a
game [21], [22]. In a game, there is a set N of n players, where
each player i ∈ N has an action or strategy set Ai prescribing
their possible actions and a utility function ui : A → R where
n
A = k=1 Ak . The utility of each player depends on the
player’s action and the actions of other players; for our model,
we represent it as a combination of a payoff and a cost.
For self-assignment of tasks, there is a set of developers (i.e,
players) and a set M of tasks. The action set Ai of developer i
corresponds to the set of assignable tasks (i.e., Ai = M ). The
payoff for each player represents some monetary or social gain
the developer receives from completed tasks. For example,
many Scrum teams track “velocity”, measured in the number
of “story points” or tasks completed during a sprint [23];
having a high velocity is seen as desirable, so we assume
a rational developer would seek to maximize their individual
velocity. Task completion can be represented by a threshold,
tj , for each task j and some function gj : A → R indicating
whether the threshold is met. Thresholds are used in public
good games [24], [25], and—in our case—can represent the
story points or developer hours for the task.
Our general model for self-assignment, then, is that the
expected payoff ui for each developer i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n}
under strategy profile a assigning effort to each task j ∈ M =
{1, 2, ..., m} would be computed as follows:
(
X fi,j (a) − ci,j (a) gj (a) ≥ tj
ui (a) =
(1)
−ci,j (a)
otherwise
j∈M

×

•
•
•
•
•

a ∈ A is a strategy profile, defined as the set of strategies
for each i ∈ N such that a = {a1 , a2 , ..., an };
fi,j (a) : A → R is the payoff to i from j under a;
ci,j (a) : A → R is the cost to i w.r.t. j under a;
gj (a) : A → R is the total effort for j under a; and
tj ∈ R is the threshold for successful completion of j.

B. How can we evaluate and measure the efficiency of developers’ strategic behavior?
Using our model, we can find Nash equilibria (NE)—
the main solution concept in games [21], [22]—for the selfassignment game. These are possible assignments of tasks
where no developer would gain any additional payoff by
changing their actions while the others remain fixed. Assuming
the developers are acting rationally (i.e., seeking to maximize
their own individual utility), the NE represent the task assignments the SOT would choose. Using our general model
defined above, a given strategy profile, a, is a NE if and only

if each player’s strategy is a best response to those of the other
players. If Ai is the set of all possible strategies for player i,
strategy profile a is a NE if and only if:
∀(i ∈ N ) ∀(a0i ∈ Ai ) ui (a) ≥ ui (a0i , a−i ).

(2)

For each NE, we can compute metrics that represent social
goods achieved by the team as a whole. For example, the
following two metrics could be computed for self-assignment
of development tasks:
• Social Welfare (SW): An overall measure of the payoff
obtained by the developers on the team. This is computed
as the sum of the payoff among all the players
P in a game
for a given strategy profile—SW (a) =
i∈N ui (a)—
and serves as a proxy for team morale in our SOT model.
• Threshold Completed (TH): The total amount of work
completed during the sprint, measured as the sum of the
threshold values for each completed task. We use this
metric as a proxy for the productivity
( of the team overall.
X
tj gj (a) ≥ tj
T H(a) =
wj (a) where wj (a) =
(3)
0
otherwise
j∈M
The social goods achieved via NE are often sub-optimal
when compared to the those from centralized assignment of
tasks, assuming the assigner will always choose the assignment
with the optimal outcome. That is, if A is the set of all possible
strategy profiles, A∗ ⊆ A is the set of all NE, α : A 7→ R is an
arbitrary social good metric, and a = argmaxa0 ∈A α(a0 ) is the
optimal strategy profile, then ∀(a∗ ∈ A∗ ) α(a) ≥ α(a∗ ). The
difference between the NE and the optimal assignment marks
the efficiency of strategic behavior, and can be computed using
the following measures [15], [16]:
Price-of-stability (PoS) = max
α(a0 )/ max
α(a∗ )
0
∗
∗

(4)

Price-of-anarchy (PoA) = max
α(a0 )/ min
α(a∗ )
∗
∗
0

(5)

a ∈A

a ∈A

a ∈A

a ∈A

For metrics like SW and TH defined above, the closer the
PoS/PoA is to 1.0, the more efficient the strategic behavior.
C. How do developers self-organize in real-world settings?
Our general model captures many important aspects of
SOTs, but the remaining functions—fi,j , ci,j , and gj —must
all be chosen with great care to accurately reflect real-world
developer behavior. We present a case study using normallydistributed parameters for these functions in Section III, but
further research with human subjects is needed to develop an
accurate model (e.g., see [20]). A future experiment could
be designed in an academic setting, using websites such as
TopCoder [26], or by observing behavior in industry. Subjects
could be organized in a SOT, with appropriate incentives
representing the payoffs and corresponding investments by the
participants representing the costs.
III. C ONCRETE E XAMPLE
Self-assignment of tasks among developers can be represented as a form of Tullock contest or all-pay auction [17]–
[20]. In a Tullock contest, the players compete for a prize

Hypothesis 1. Smaller development teams self-organize more
efficiently than do larger teams.
Using a concrete realization of our general model from
Section II, we can compute the PoS and PoA for different
team sizes and directly compare the efficiency in terms of
the SW and TH metrics, which stand as proxies for team
morale and productivity, respectively. To demonstrate this, we
simulated our model 100 times each for every combination
of n ∈ [1, 9] and m ∈ [1, 9], where ai is a binary vector of
length m with at most one 1, fi,j (a) = (ai,j si,j vi,j )/gj (a),
ci,j was chosen randomly
from a uniform distribution on
P
[0, 1], and gj (a) = i∈N ai,j (si,j , vi,j are random variables
representing skill and task preference, respectively). We then
calculated PoS/PoA for each simulation. Figure 1 depicts the
PoS/PoA as the number of developers (n) increases from 1 to
9, showing a correlated increase in the median PoS/PoA. This
supports Hyp. 1 in terms of morale.
Considering TH provides a different picture. Figure 2 shows
the mean PoS/PoA in terms of TH as n and m vary. By this
metric, teams with fewer developers are more likely to have
unbounded PoS/PoA (the “Inf” squares) where no tasks were
completed in either the best/worst NE. This provides some
indication that smaller SOTs are not more efficient than plandriven teams in terms of productivity. Specifically, smaller
teams (with fewer tasks) may be more likely to not finish
any tasks at all when self-assigning than would teams where
a centralized planner assigns tasks. Our model indicates that
smaller teams may be efficient when considering teams of four
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Fig. 1. Box plots for P oS/P oA w.r.t. social welfare (SW ) vs. the number
of developers (N=900 for each value on the x-axis). Median P oS/P oA rises
as the number of developers increases, as does variance in P oS/P oA.
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by selecting the level of effort they are willing to commit
to a contest. The winning player for a given strategy profile
receives the prize, discounted by the cost of their effort.
In some variants—including our model—the payoff is given
to each contestant proportional to their contribution of total
effort. The expected payoff to a given player for any given
contest is a linear function of the payoff and the strategy
profile. This can be extended to comprise a set of related
contests, where each player’s strategy defines both how much
effort to expend and to which contest the effort will be
allocated [19], [27], [28]. For self-assignment of tasks on
a development team, the players are the developers and the
contests are the development tasks.
Each player selects their strategy for the game by allocating
some (or no) portion of their total effort (e.g., available
hours for the sprint) to the tasks. The player then receives
a payoff for each completed task, proportional to the effort
expended and discounted by the cost of their effort. The
contest representing each task would provide a payoff only
if the total contribution to that contest met or exceeded the
threshold, but would still incur a cost to contributing players.
By using PoS/PoA as a measure of efficiency, we can use
our model to evaluate important research questions regarding
SOTs. For example, consider the “two-pizza” rule attributed
to Jeff Bezos—the development team should never be so large
that two pizzas cannot feed everyone. We reframe that rule as
a testable hypothesis as follows:
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Fig. 2. Mean (N=100) price-of-stability (P oS) and price-of-anarchy (P oA)
for the completed thresholds (T H) vs. the number of developers and tasks.
Darker (greener) show a lower P oS/P oA, indicating more efficient selforganization. Smaller teams and fewer tasks have unbounded P oS/P oA.

or more developers who are self assigning four or more tasks.
In that case, the PoS/PoA for SW is clearly lower than for larger
teams (see Figure 1) and the mean PoS/PoA in terms of TH
is still bounded; there is little difference in the mean PoS/Poa
for roughly n > 4 and m > 4. This provides a demonstration
of how our game-theoretical model may be used to solve
software engineering questions, but a more rigorous evaluation
is needed for this and other hypotheses. Furthermore, realworld human studies are also needed to validate the model
against how developers actually behave.
IV. F UTURE D IRECTIONS
The example detailed in Section II-B is only one of myriad
potential findings that could come from a game-theoretical
model of SOTs. The utility function ui for the general model
described in Section II can be defined in many ways, and could
by used in a variety of different types of games. The PoS/PoA
could also measure efficiency for other metrics.
Model Parameters: For example, our general model
defines fi,j (a) as the expected payoff for developer i from
project j in strategy profile a. Additional parameters could
be included as part of the f function to model other aspects
of the real world, such as developer skill. McConnell [29]
has proposed that developer skill can vary by up to a single
order of magnitude, with the most skilled “10x” developers
providing significantly more value than others. By including
a variable for developer skill in our model, we could evaluate
hypotheses relating to skill differences among developers or

between SOTs. The payoff for a given task may also be
impacted by other developers working on the same task.
Brooks [30] famously described the diminishing returns of
adding more developers to a single project, and Vasilescu,
et al. [31] have shown that multitasking may be beneficial
to productivity; both of these aspects of developer behavior
could be included as part of the fi,j function in our model.
We see many avenues for future research in developing specific
functions with such parameters. Our model also assumes that
the payoff for a given task may differ among the developers on
the team. This could be used to model developer preferences
in task selection, as was explored in a human factor study by
Masood, et al. [11]. By allowing flexibility in the parameters,
our general game-theoretic model can be adapted to match the
findings of such human factor studies; we intend to pursue
such studies in the future as a necessary validation of the
model we propose here. Our model could also be extended
with other parameters to represent other aspects of SOTs—
negotiation among team members, overconfidence, etc.
Game Variants: Our general model could also be employed in a variety of different game formulations. In Section II-B, we describe a single realization of our model,
assuming the game is a game of complete information. In
such a game, every player knows all the possible strategies
and all the payoffs for each such strategy for every player
in the game. This assumption is often a steep hurdle for
games that try to model human behavior in the real world.
We also assume the developers are perfectly rational and aim
to select an action that maximizes the utility, which may be
incorrect. More research is needed to demonstrate our model’s
effectiveness for games of incomplete information [32] or with
different bounded rationality assumptions [33], [34].
Scrum teams also tend to engage in self-organizing behavior
repeatedly with the same set of players. Repeated contests
behave differently than the single contests simulated in Section II-B [35], [36], and could use further study. Hoda, et
al. [7] found that developers on SOTs do not all behave
the same, as assumed in our simulations; the different roles
assumed by the team members over time may affect their
strategies when modeled as a repeated game. Our model
assumes that all developers pick tasks simultaneously; in many
Scrum teams, selection of individual tasks by developers is
scattered throughout the sprint. These sequential games are
also studied in game theory research [18], [37], [38], and we
intend to explore their ramifications in future work. As with
the different numerical parameters of the model, more realworld experiments are needed to determine which games are
consistent with real-world behavior.
Social-good Metrics: Lastly, we evaluated our model in
this paper against two social-good metrics—the mean social
welfare (SW) and the completed threshold (TH), standing in
for team morale and productivity, respectively. The priceof-stability/-anarchy measures we used to evaluate efficiency
could be computed for other metrics to measure the efficiency
of other aspects of self-organizing teams. For example, Masood, et al. [11] found that developers often select tasks with

which they are not particularly familiar, as a means to improve
their skills. If the growth in developer skill could be quantified
and measured, it could also be included as a metric in our
model, providing another dimension for analysis of efficiency.
V. R ELATED W ORK
Self-organization in Agile Development: Self organization in agile development has been widely reviewed [8],
[9], [39]. Hoda, et al., conducted a series of surveys to
classify roles that emerge on self-organizing teams [5]–[7],
[10]. Our model does not consider these roles, but could be
extended to account for these variations. Masood, et al., also
conducted human factor studies on self-organization, including
the motivations of software developers when self assigning
tasks [11], [12]. As described in Section IV, motivation could
be represented as parameters in our general model.
Contests and Other Games: Our model follows a stream
of research on Tullock contests [19], [27], [28], [40] where a
set of contestants determines the amount of effort to exert in
either one or multiple contests in order to achieve a payoff.
Congestion games [41] are also related; these present a set of
resources and a set of players where each player’s strategies
comprise some subset of the set of resources, with the goal
of minimizing wait times for use of the resource. Our model
extends these games with thresholds, similar to public good
games [24], [25], such that positive payoffs can only be
obtained with sufficient effort.
Game Theory in SE: Game theoretic concepts have
been applied to many aspects of software engineering and
development, but we present the first non-cooperative model
for task assignment on self-organizing teams. Lagesse [13]
briefly proposed a cooperative model of task assignment,
but provided no concrete evaluation. Others have used game
theory to model other aspects of agile development, ranging
from stand-up meetings to code reviews [42], [43]. GavidiaCalderon, et al. [14] use game theoretic concepts to drive
their mechanism design framework; we believe that price-ofstability/-anarchy presents a novel tool for mechanism design
in general, and intend to explore its use in future work.
VI. C ONCLUSION
We present a novel, general model for understanding strategic behavior of agile software developers, building off of and
extending solid foundations in game theory. We introduce the
price-of-stability and price-of-anarchy as well-founded metrics which the software engineering research community can
employ to evaluate the efficiency of self-organizing software
development teams. We describe how our general framework
could be adapted to fit real-world behavior, leaving human
subject studies tune the model as future work. We demonstrate
the use of our model in the software engineering domain with a
simulated case study. We describe a variety of new directions
for future research that could spring from our model, from
extensions and refinements of our general model to new human
factor studies that examine developer behavior in the field. We
believe our new idea provides a solid foundation for gametheoretical research in the software engineering domain.
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